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In this valuable book Professor Machlup gives us a comprehensive analysis-and a
forceful condemnation-of the basing-point system of pricing in the United States, a
system whose merits are today being disputed in Congress. This is no fly-by-night book;
the material included is part of a large volume of material which Machlup has been
gathering over a period of years for a forthcoming book on the general subject of price
discrimination. The author with the cooperation of The Blakiston Company rushed the
basing-point sections of the analysis into print so that the economist would have his day
in court before and not after the legislative decision was reached.
At times one is sadly forced to conclude that jurists, legislators, lawyers, businessmen,
editorial writers especially, and even economists do not make sense because they have no
sure grasp of even the most elementary mechanics of the basing-point system. Machlup's
first task is to set down the terminology and operating rules of the system. To this
reviewer's knowledge Chapter I is the best currently available systematic explanation
of these fundamentals.
Although Machlup recognizes and briefly treats the interplay of legal, business, eco-
nomic, and political factors in the present controversy, he has argued his case mainly
on the grounds of theoretical economic considerations. His first major concern is with
the "monopolistic"I nature of the animal. He reviews the old errors which have made
it possible in honest confusion to identify the price uniformity resulting from the basing-
point system as evidence of competition. And he lays the bogy of "local monopoly,"
which the basing-point system is alleged to prevent.2  He notes the significant incon-
sistency of industry statements that (I) the basing-point system is competitive and (2)
frequent deviations from the fixed basing-point price in the form of "price-shading"
introduce competitive elements into a seemingly rigid system.
Machlup's second major concern is with the "discriminatory" nature of the basing-
point system. His simple test of non-discrimination is the lack of interest of a seller
in the functional, geographic, racial, and other characteristics of the buyer. The seller
under the basing-point system, of course, cannot meet this test since he is quite interested
in the buyer's place of business and quotes delivered prices which do not equalize his
mill net but which conform to the established basing-point price. As seen in footnote
two above, the basing-point method of pricing systematically operates to discriminate
against a consumer located near a non-base mill. Another type of discrimination is
against consuming areas in which the substitute products of another industry are un-
available or consuming areas in which the expansion of capacity is not welcomed by
the large producers. Suppose that a small Chicago producer in a basing-point industry
dominated by a large Pittsburgh firm were to attempt to build up its volume by an-
nouncing a new, lower basing-point price at Chicago. Under the basing-point system
' Monopoly for him is the extent to which there is a oneness in decision-making in an industry,
whether because of the dominance of one firm or because of the practice of forming decisions in the
light of how other firms in the industry are expected to react.
' Crudely speaking, under the basing-point system a consumer located near a non-base mill is able
to select among many sellers located at varying distances, all of whom charge the high, monopolistically
established price, while under a uniform f.o.b. system he would be quoted many different prices and
would presumably choose the low price of the near-by "local monopoly" seller.
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the Pittsburgh producer would meet the new low delivered price by absorbing freighta
on shipments into the Chicago area, and would step up selling efforts or would resort to
price-shading in order to punish the upstart. Even if the Pittsburgh firm took no punitive
action, the working of the basing-point system would automatically lead to its accepting
a lower mill net in sales to the Chicago area, a clear case of built-in local price dis-
crimination concealed under the socially acceptable guise of "meeting competition in
the Chicago market!" The average mill net of the Pittsburgh producer would be cut
slightly, that of the Chicago firm greatly. Hence the Chicago firm will be induced to
go along with the Pittsburgh basing-point price or a high Chicago basing-point price
and to be content with its normal share of the industry's volume of business. And the
Chicago customers of the industry will be discriminated against.
Secret price deals outside the basing-point framework are most often in recognition
of the power of large buyers. This type of price discrimination is not a feature of the
basing-point system per se.
Machlup's third major concern is with the waste of economic resources arising out
of the basing-point system. The first of these wastes that usually comes to mind, "cross-
hauling," involves many little byways of economic analysis that the author treats briefly.
Other wastes considered are the uneconomic location of industry capacity and the uneco-
nomic location of buyers' places of business.
A fourth major concern is the concentration of economic power under the basing-
point system. Machlup demonstrates how small firms are encouraged to merge with
large, how small firms are discouraged from expanding, how entry to the industry is
made less attractive, and how "special" prices are likely to favor the larger buyers.
The author regards compulsory uniform f.o.b. pricing as the only desirable practical
alternative to the basing-point system. He does not go into detail as to the methods and
degrees of compulsion or uniformity.
One of the extremely interesting economic aspects of f.o.b. pricing is whether or
not it would lead to "ruinous competition." First, it should be recognized that indus.
trial monopoly and uniform f.o.b. pricing may exist together.4 The prevention of further
merger and perhaps some fractionalization of industry presumably would be prescribed
also if one went along with uniform f.o.b. pricing. These problems Machlup recognizes.
He believes that the danger of "ruinous competition" is overrated. Among other things
he points out that under a uniform f.o.b. system a firm which must cut prices on all
near-by safe business in order to extend its market boundaries will hesitate taking the
action, the more so if it may reasonably expect retaliatory price cuts by rival sellers.,
It is not to be expected that Machlup would present as complete an analysis of the
various facets of the uniform f.o.b. system as he does of the basing-point system. He
does not, for instance, consider the vexing problem of what to do about large buyers
of an industry's product if the industry is compelled to adopt a uniform f.o.b. price
system. Would buyers be prevented from exerting monopsonistic pressure in the form
'Machlup explains why neither "freight absorption" nor "phantom freight" are unambiguous
terms.
It is apparent that the ease with which monopoly is established, the kinds of monopoly, and the
effects of monopoly would differ considerably under the basing-point and monopoly type f.o.b. systems.
'Much different is the point of view of Professor John M. Clark, a leading scholar in the field of
industrial price policy, who feels that any such sharp break with the basing-point system would probably
bring destructive price wars, great dislocation of labor, and a radical readjustment of investment values.
See, for example, his Basing Point Method o1 Pice Quoting, 4 CAN. J. ECost. AND POL. Sel. 477 (1938).
Professor Clark feels that the presence of large overhead costs and the economic strength of large buyers
make a considerable measure of restriction inevitable in these industries.
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of paying different delivered prices for their purchases of a product? What about the
existence of monopolistic suppliers of raw materials and labor services who might hold
the whip hand over a chastised, fractionalized, ex-basing-point industry?
A major issue Machlup mentions is the increase in government "interference" that a
compulsory f.o.b. pricing system would entail On this point is not FDR's dictum
applicable, namely, that "the minimum regulation businessmen can expect is the preserva-
tion of competition?" Macblup, as an "old-fashioned liberal," is probably going to be
increasingly unhappy as few forces emerge to block the movement toward Bigger Business,
Bigger Labor, and Bigger Government.
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The author expresses his own credo (p. 50) as being ". old-fashioned liberalism: an unbounded
respect for political and economic freedom, a belief that a truly competitive order is not only the best
guarantee for the preservation of freedom but also the most efficient mechanism for the allocation of
economic resources, a conviction that private property and free private enterprise are necessary for the
working of a competitive order, a disrepect for vested interests . . . and a confidence that a free society
can be established and maintained by a people who insist on a wide dispersion and decentralization of
economic and political power."

